Language-body continuity in the linguistics-semiology-poetics-traductology of Henri Meschonnic by Joseph, John
  
 
 
 
Edinburgh Research Explorer 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Language-body continuity in the linguistics-semiology-poetics-
traductology of Henri Meschonnic
Citation for published version:
Joseph, J 2018, 'Language-body continuity in the linguistics-semiology-poetics-traductology of Henri
Meschonnic' Comparative Critical Studies, vol. 15, no. 3, pp. 311-329. DOI: 10.3366/ccs.2018.0298
Digital Object Identifier (DOI):
10.3366/ccs.2018.0298
Link:
Link to publication record in Edinburgh Research Explorer
Document Version:
Peer reviewed version
Published In:
Comparative Critical Studies
Publisher Rights Statement:
This article has been accepted for publication by Edinburgh University Press in "Comparative Critical Studies"
and can be accessed at: https://www.euppublishing.com/doi/10.3366/ccs.2018.0298 
General rights
Copyright for the publications made accessible via the Edinburgh Research Explorer is retained by the author(s)
and / or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing these publications that users recognise and
abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
Take down policy
The University of Edinburgh has made every reasonable effort to ensure that Edinburgh Research Explorer
content complies with UK legislation. If you believe that the public display of this file breaches copyright please
contact openaccess@ed.ac.uk providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and
investigate your claim.
Download date: 05. Apr. 2019
1 
 
Language-Body Continuity in the Linguistics-Semiology- 
Poetics-Traductology of Henri Meschonnic 
 
JOHN E. JOSEPH 
ABSTRACT 
Henri Meschonnic criticised structuralist linguistics for assuming that progress lay with ever-
increasing specialisation, and for narrowing its scope to exclude the literary. For Meschonnic, 
a linguistics that does not take account of the poetic – particularly of rhythm – is closing its 
ears to the very heartbeat of language. Rhythm is at the core of a language-body continuity 
which structuralists ignored because they considered it unconnected to meaning. That, for 
Meschonnic, was their primordial error, and he argued tirelessly for ‘the continuous’ in 
language and linguistics. The programme he devised has certain problems. He never makes 
clear where the structuralism which he rejects starts and ends; indeed, he himself can be seen 
as a structuralist along the lines described by Cassirer. Both Saussure and Benveniste occupy 
a curious position in Meschonnic’s structuralism. Also problematic is Meschonnic’s tendency 
to idealise the Hebrew language and Biblical texts, contrasting them with Greek language and 
thought in a way that borders on, and sometimes crosses into, Orientalism. A comparison 
with Havelock’s treatment of the evolution of Greek from Homer to Plato suggests however 
that the Romantic and Orientalising aspects of Meschonnic’s treatment are merely contingent, 
not essential, to the position he is taking. 
 
For Henri Meschonnic (1932-2000), the tragedy of structuralism lay in what he called 
its ‘triomphalisme d’un scientisme du discontinu’ (triumphalism of scientising the 
discontinuous).1 It is true: ask a linguist what linguistics is, and the answer you are likely to 
get is, first, something about the scientific study of language, and then a litany of the sub-
specialisations, phonology, syntax, semantics, historical linguistics, sociolinguistics etc. 
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(where cetera will not include poetics) and what they are concerned with.2 The existence of 
those sub-fields, with their division of the labour of analysing sound, order, meaning and the 
rest each allotted to specialists, is taken to signify the field’s progress to a mature state. 
Specialists tend to avoid treading onto each other’s territory; yet common sense would point 
to an understanding of language as a whole, rather than the institutionalising of discontinuity, 
as the ultimate goal. 
Taking inspiration from Émile Benveniste’s (1902-1976) conception of ‘énonciation’ 
(‘utterance’, a perspective that starts from the speaker or writer rather than from the linguistic 
system),3 Meschonnic devoted his mature career to exposing the structuralist fetishisation of 
the discontinous and shifting the focus to the continu (‘continuous’) in language. It is not 
always clear who did and did not count as a structuralist for him, though Ferdinand de 
Saussure (1857-1913) definitely did not. In fact, when he reads out the charge sheet against 
structuralism, each crime, of which the following are samples, is described in its opposition 
to Saussure: 
 
1. quand Saussure dit système, notion dynamique, le structuralisme dit structure, notion 
formelle et ahistorique; 
2. quand Saussure pose que sur le langage on n’a que des points de vue, notion capitale: 
des représentations, le structuralisme avec le signe se présente comme décrivant la 
nature du langage; 
3. et Saussure construit la notion de point de vue selon une systématicité interne toute 
déductive, mais le structuralisme a fait des sciences du langage descriptives […]. 
(1. where Saussure says system, a dynamic notion, structuralism says structure, a formal 
and ahistorical notion; 2. where Saussure posits that with language all we have are 
points of view – a key notion: representations – structuralism with the sign presents 
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itself as describing the nature of language; 3. and Saussure constructs the notion of 
point of view according to an entirely deductive internal systematicity, but structuralism 
has created descriptive sciences of language […].)4 
 
Again, he is right about the discontinuous – though it is complicated. Starting in the 1920s, 
those who got called structuralists, or more rarely, called themselves that, were torn between 
two urges. One was to reject the methods of an earlier generation that wanted to decompose 
phenomena into elements. That can be construed as a desire for continuousness. The other 
was to seek out what connects phenomena to each other, and doing that demanded the 
decomposition into discontinuous elements that their first urge was to reject. 
Early structuralists invoked Gestalt psychology as continuous with what they were 
trying to achieve. By 1945, the first volume of Word, the journal co-founded by Roman 
Jakobson (1896-1982) and André Martinet (1908-1999), contains two articles laying out 
visions of structuralism that superficially overlap, but in fact embody these complexly 
opposed urges. For the older writer, Ernst Cassirer (1874-1945), systems such as language 
need to be approached holistically.5 Language for Cassirer is organic, ‘in the sense that it 
does not consist of detached, isolated, segregated facts. It forms a coherent whole in which all 
parts are interdependent upon each other’.6 The younger Claude Lévi-Strauss (1908-2009) 
seems at first to be singing from the same hymn sheet when he rejects the analysis of kinship 
by W. H. R. Rivers (1864-1922) on the grounds that it is concerned merely with an atomistic 
charting of the details of relationships in some particular society:  
 
Chaque détail de terminologie, chaque règle spéciale du mariage, est rattachée à une 
coutume différente, comme une conséquence ou comme un vestige: on tombe dans une 
débauche de discontinuité.  
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(Each terminological detail, each special marriage rule, is attached to a different 
custom, like a consequence or a vestige: we descend into an orgy of discontinuity.)7  
 
But a careful reading shows how Lévi-Strauss sings in a different key from Cassirer’s. His 
concern is not with organicity, but with the failure to take a universalist point of view, one 
that looks past superficial differences to find how kinship systems are fundamentally the 
same from culture to culture. They must be so, Lévi-Strauss assumes, because the human 
relationships they encode are the same. Taking maternal uncles as an example, he writes:  
 
Nous voyons donc que l’avunculat, pour être compris, doit être traité comme une 
relation intérieure à un système, et que c’est le système lui-même qui doit être considéré 
dans son ensemble, pour en apercevoir la structure. 
(We see that the avunculate, to be understood, must be treated as a relationship interior 
to a system, and that it is the system itself which must be considered in its totality, in 
order to perceive its structure.)8 
 
If this sounds like Cassirer’s holism, the resemblance is deceptive because of what Lévi-
Strauss understands by system. It is not like Saussure’s language system, which is specific to 
each particular language. Lévi-Strauss is not talking about the Yoruba kinship system, as 
distinct from the Inuit one. He means the human kinship system, regarded as a product of 
evolutionary forces.  
There is a double continuity-discontinuity tension at work in this defining structuralist 
moment: on the one hand, atomism versus holism, Cassirer’s tension; on the other hand, the 
language-culture-particular versus the universal, Lévi-Strauss’s tension. Meschonnic’s 
discontent with the discontinuous falls within the first type, and when, as we shall see, he 
5 
 
takes up arms against the structuralist dissociation of language from the body, he cites 
language-culture-particular examples (notably from the Hebrew of the Old Testament, but 
also from modern languages) as evidence for a universal language-body continuity. Any 
language-culture-particular versus universal tension is left aside, or at least pushed into the 
background. The tensions we repress can come back to haunt us, and that, I shall argue, is 
potentially the case with Meschonnic’s approach to the Hebrew-language body. 
Lévi-Strauss sees the development of phonology, as opposed to the merely physical, 
empirical study of phonetics, as playing, ‘vis-à-vis des sciences sociales, le même rôle 
rénovateur que la physique nucléaire, par exemple, a joué pour l’ensemble des sciences 
exactes’ (‘playing for the social sciences the same renewing role as nuclear physics, for 
example, has played for the exact sciences’).9 He locates the renewal in four fundamental 
points of method identified by Nicolai S. Trubetzkoy (1890-1938):10 
 
[E]n premier lieu, la phonologie passe de l’étude des phénomènes linguistiques 
conscients à celle de leur infrastructure inconsciente; elle refuse de traiter les termes 
comme des entités indépendantes, prenant au contraire comme base de son analyse les 
relations entres les termes; elle introduit la notion de système [...]; enfin elle vise à la 
découverte de lois générales soit trouvées par induction, soit déduites logiquement, [...] 
ce qui leur donne un caractère absolu. 
([F]irst, phonology passes from the study of conscious linguistic phenomena to the 
study of their unconscious linguistic infrastructure; it refuses to treat terms as 
independent entities, instead taking as the basis of its analysis the relations between 
terms; it introduces the notion of system [...]; and finally it aims at discovering general 
laws either by induction or by logical deduction, [...] which gives them an absolute 
character.)11 
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The second and third points, concerning relations and system, are ones Cassirer would have 
endorsed. But the unconscious is not a concept Cassirer deals with. Although he recognizes 
that consciousness ‘grows’ in the child, the dyad suggested by Lévi-Strauss would have been 
too simplistic for his liking. 
When Cassirer talks about atomism and holism, it is on the level of a particular system. 
Lévi-Strauss talks about atomism and totality of the general system, for example the 
avunculate, considered universally. The two approaches are not always at cross purposes, 
only sometimes, but enough to generate an enduring tension within structuralism. A defining 
moment came in 1955, when the succès fou of Lévi-Strauss’s Tristes Tropiques defined 
structuralism for the public at large and for the next generation of scholars.12 Cassirer’s 
worries about internal discontinuity were shunted aside, not to vanish but to fester. 
For Meschonnic and his contemporaries who took up academic posts with the 
expansion of the Parisian university system after May 1968, structuralism stood for 
discontinuity. In linguistics, that meant treating phonology, prosody, morphology, syntax, 
semantics, semiology and so on as separate levels of language and distinct areas of 
specialisation; and divorcing linguistics from poetics or applied areas such as translation, and 
ultimately even semiology, though linguistics continued to focus on the sign and 
combinations of signs as the essence of language. This never sat well with Meschonnic, but 
since he was teaching linguistics, he could only go so far in opposing it in these early years. 
Nor could he fail to note that, despite their doctrine of how only spoken language is real 
language, when it came to analysing them, linguists implicitly treated languages in terms of 
the written. Amongst the aspects of language that writing does not normally capture is 
rhythm. Linguistics reserves a tiny corner of prosodic analysis for rhythm: students learn for 
example that French is a syllable-timed language, whereas English is stress-timed. But since 
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this is not considered to affect meaning, it is devoid of semiological significance, and treated 
as marginal. It matters in poetics, where rhythm is a central aspect of language – as a result of 
which structuralists separated out ‘poetic language’ as something apart, only tangentially 
connected to the ‘real’ language that they dealt with. Indeed they regarded this separation as 
part of the maturing of linguistics as a science, distinct from the ‘philology’ out of which it 
had developed in the previous century.13 
Meschonnic could see how self-defeating this was. Linguistics was setting itself up to 
be overwhelmed by an ‘informatics’ which treats language as a conduit for transferring 
information; and while representation and communication have been the functions focussed 
on by philosophers and grammarians since ancient Greece, they are continuous with other 
functions which are not trivial – which indeed are arguably less trivial than the two 
traditionally recognised ones. Language is the medium of all our social relations, including 
with ourselves. It is life. That cardinal equation, continuous with but more radical than 
Ludwig Wittgenstein’s (1889-1951) Lebensform (form of life),14 is expressed in one way or 
another in nearly everything Meschonnic writes.  
The error of linguistics, for Meschonnic, is to have treated language in ways that range 
it on the side of the dead, in part by basing itself on a dichotomy between form and content, 
sound and sense, that amounts to fatal vivisection; and by accepting rather than challenging 
the notion of poetry as being something distinct from ordinary language – something more 
organised, less chaotic. These are exactly the qualities that linguistics itself wants to bring 
about in the understanding of language, even as it excludes the poetic from the ordinary 
language which it takes as its subject matter. A perverse exclusion, because  
 
La poésie fait vie de tout. Elle est cette forme de vie qui fait langage de tout. Elle ne 
nous arrive que si le langage même est devenu une forme de vie. 
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(Poetry makes life out of everything. It’s that form of life that makes language out of 
everything. It happens to us only if language itself has become a form of life.)15  
 
As the song says, the rhythm of life is a powerful beat, puts a tingle in your fingers and a 
tingle in your feet. It is bodily, as well as mental, or rather it overrides the division between 
the two. In one of his last articles, Meschonnic wrote: 
 
Le continue corps-langage, c’est alors l’enchaînement des rythmes de position, 
d’attaque et de finale, d’inclusion, de conjonction, de rupture, de répétition lexicale, de 
répétition syntaxique, de série prosodique. C’est une sémantique sérielle. 
(Language-body continuity is then the linking of the rhythms of position, onset and 
coda, inclusion, conjunction, break, lexical repetition, syntactic repetition, prosodic 
series. It is a serial semantics.)16  
 
These two sentences carry out a revolution in how to conceive of language. Not as something 
‘cognitive’, to use the most vacuous of modern linguistic terms, but as continuous with the 
body; and understood first of all as a sequence, not of phonemes, but of rhythms, of which he 
here lists nine types. The types ignore the canonical discontinuities of phonology, 
morphology and syntax, treating them all as part of the repertoire of rhythmic devices. In the 
most revolutionary move of all, he refuses the fundamental doctrine that rhythm is separate 
from meaning, instead declaring language-body continuity to be a serial semantics. 
A linguistics that shunts rhythm to its margins will not grasp language, not even on the 
page – least of all the scriptural page. If the Bible is the word of God, the rhythms of the 
Hebrew Old Testament are sacred. And where, Meschonnic wondered, have those rhythms 
gone to in the New Testament? Many passages of it are translations of Old Testament verses, 
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but without the music. And what about later translations? Can language-body continuity be 
restored in contemporary translational practice? To address such questions, we must abandon 
our conventional disciplinary boundaries and embrace a unified linguistics-semiology-
poetics-traductology. The obstacles to doing so lie partly in the institutionalised separation of 
disciplines, and partly in the incommensurable ways of talking about these problems and 
issues that the disciplines have spawned. 
 Both the agony and the ecstasy of reading Meschonnic stem from his determined 
struggle to avoid clichés and idées fixes. The ecstasy of his revelations is something we pay 
for through the agony of disruptive reading. Anyone who does not find Meschonnic’s texts 
discomfiting is not paying attention. It is funny that English uses French borrowings for both 
cliché and idée fixe. It makes you wonder: is there something particularly French about 
clichés or idées fixes, such that the English-speaking mind would never have conceived of 
them unaided? 
But there go I falling into an idée fixe, the one that claims we can map features of 
language onto culture, such that every speaker of a language is assumed to share all the 
aspects of the culture with which it is associated. It is an irresistible draw that Meschonnic 
constantly enjoins us to resist and to (re)think. Penser le langage, penser la poétique – the 
Meschonnic cliché par excellence.  
Great thinkers and writers violate their own key ideas. By definition: without that 
complexity, that deconstructive tension, their work would lack richness. It would be an 
instruction manual. So it is no slight to Meschonnic to note that he himself did not always 
resist the pull of the idée fixe that links facts about language to the culture of its speakers, 
indeed to their whole mode of thinking. Au contraire: this is part of what makes him great. 
The idea of language-body continuity has a venerable heritage.17 A third term disturbs 
the continuity: mind, most often conceived in a binary opposition to body. But it has not 
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always been so conceived. The ‘mind-body problem’ has taken various forms in the context 
of language across the centuries, and over the last twenty years a pendulum swing took place 
within philosophy and cognitive science in the English-speaking world. Previously these 
fields had been concerned with the mind as traditionally conceived by analytic philosophers 
and Chomskyan linguists, and in various ways by different schools of psychologists. The 
1990s saw a reaction against the so-called ‘Cartesian’ conception of consciousness as 
contained within an individual mind, defining what it is to be a Subject, indeed to be 
human.18 This mind was conceived of as intracranial, that is, contained within the brain, with 
the body as its instrument. The philosophers pushing against this conception argued that the 
mind is embodied in a more extensive sense than just being embrained.19 The extended mind 
includes the whole nervous system, out to the skin and the sensory organs, and possibly 
beyond to certain tools such as the blind person’s walking stick. It might also involve other 
people, in a ‘distributed’ cognition. But on each of these extensions, philosophers differ. 
One of the big obstacles to reconstructing this history is terminological, both across and 
within languages. A word like spiritus, the etymon of French esprit ‘mind’, does not mean 
the same thing from one century to the next, nor indeed to everyone at any given time. Like 
Hebrew ruach, Greek pneuma and archaic Greek psykhē, spiritus covers the semantic space 
of English wind, breath, spirit in various senses, and at some point something like mind.20 In 
its sense of breath, spiritus links the mind directly to the body: the lungs and the muscles and 
nerves that control them, and the exhaled breath in which we expel, express, our thought in 
language. Animals appear to us to do something similar, though we imagine their ‘thought’ as 
much less complex. The continuity between animal and human expression was at the 
forefront of Aristotle’s concerns; as for humans, he believed that the παθήματα τῆς ψυχῆς 
(the passions of the mind/soul), which our voices express, are ταὐτὰ πᾶσι (the same for all 
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people).21 A generation later, Epicurus, in a letter to Herodotus, made breath the cornerstone 
of a significantly different account of language from Aristotle’s: 
 
 ὅθεν καὶ τὰ ὀνόματα ἐξ ἀρχῆς μὴ θέσει γενέσθαι, ἀλλ’ αὐτὰς τὰς φύσεις τῶν ἀνθρώπων 
καθ’ ἕκαστα ἔθνη ἴδια πασχούσας πάθη καὶ ἴδια λαμβανούσας φαντάσματα ἰδίως τὸν 
ἀέρα ἐκπέμπειν στελλόμενον ὑφ’ ἑκάστων τῶν παθῶν καὶ τῶν φαντασμάτῶν, ὡς ἄν 
ποτε καὶ ἡ παρὰ τοὺς τόπους τῶν ἐθνῶν διαφορὰ εἴη· 
(And so names too were not at first deliberately given to things, but men’s natures 
according to their different nationalities had their own peculiar feelings and received 
their peculiar impressions, and so each in their own way emitted air formed into shape 
by each of these feelings and impressions, according to the differences made in the 
different nations by the places of their abode as well.)22  
 
Emitting air – breath – pneuma – differing by the feelings and sensory impressions peculiar 
to each ethnos. This answers a big question Aristotle left tacit: why do different languages 
exist? The one point on which Epicurus directly contradicts Aristotle is when he says that 
passions and impressions differ ethnically. This cannot be reconciled with Aristotle’s belief 
that the passions of the mind/soul are the same for all. Epicurus offers a dramatic increase in 
explanatory power, a framework for understanding languages as direct expressions of the 
national or racial soul, rather than merely different ways of encoding thoughts that are 
universally human. It seems like a lot of benefit at little cost, but what in fact is at stake is the 
conception of a common humanity. The passage from Epicurus lays out what will be 
enduring themes in the bodily approach to language outside the medical context: the central 
place of breath and the organs that produce it; the effect of racial difference, temperament and 
complexion; the roles of innate nature and environmental experience. At some level, each 
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particular language has been shaped by its use in mitigating between each of those who speak 
it and their physical and social world, which, at the same time, the language shapes. 
Benveniste showed how this was so for the vocabulary of the Indo-European languages,23 and 
to some extent for their syntax and morphology as well, though his attention was on where 
the body was, relative to other bodies and to society and its institutions (buying and selling, 
for example, which overlapped with gifts, sacrifice, marriage, slavery), not on what the body 
was, except in terms of gender. The language-body nexus is not configured in ethnic-racial 
terms for Benveniste.  
Meschonnic often writes about language-body continuity in the context of the Hebrew 
Bible, which he contrasts with the ‘Greco-Christian’ model of thought and language 
represented by the New Testament. He traces this later model to Plato, and enjoins us to de-
Platonise our thinking about rhythm.24 He is not the first to draw a line between a cerebral 
Platonic rationality and another form of rationality that involves the whole body, its 
movement and rhythms. In his 1963 book Preface to Plato, Eric Havelock (1903-1988) 
argued for just such a historical divide between Homeric epic and Platonic dialogue.25 I shall 
return to Havelock, who offers a helping hand with a problem in Meschonnic that I think we 
need to confront. 
We can let Meschonnic use Plato as his whipping boy for critiquing a model of thought 
and language in which the body has only a trivial, mechanical role to play. For Plato, the 
reality of language – in fact, of everything – is after all in a heaven of the ideal. But it was his 
pupil, Aristotle, who produced the first enduring account of language as a bodily production, 
and Epicurus, a generation later, who provided the second. So we should be wary of 
Meschonnic’s tendency to accept the essentialising of a ‘Greek’ way of thinking language 
that is the reverse mirror image of the Hebrew one. This too has a long heritage, which is 
bound up with Orientalism, but which is really so pervasive in modern thought that we all 
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buy into it in some degree – think of the very different status accorded in most universities to 
the philosophy departments in which Greek thought supplies the foundation, and the theology 
departments in which the Hebrew Bible is studied. The essentialism is hard to see, and harder 
to resist.  
Language-body continuity is a potentially dangerous idea. I am not rejecting 
Meschonnic’s or Havelock’s approaches, but trying to encourage their acceptance by facing 
up to their key weakness, this idealising Romanticism and Orientalism, and showing that it is 
not in fact crucial to what they are saying, however much their writing may make it appear 
so. My stance here is the same as I have long taken with Wilhelm von Humboldt:26 if we can 
distance ourselves from the cultural idealisations that have made him the target of charges of 
racism – unfair charges in historical terms, but devastating – we can rescue the essence of his 
genius. It demands what I call a resistant embrace. 
I embrace Meschonnic when he is pulling me in a direction I was not previously 
inclined to go in. I resist him when I feel him pulling me in an idée fixe direction that is 
familiar to me because I too already feel that pull, the power of that idealisation of cultures 
isomorphic with languages, and religions, and peoples. The Greeks. The Hebrews. These are 
overly powerful concepts, seemingly innocuous when we are talking about poetry, but always 
a step or two away from getting turned into something ugly. Hence the need to ask whether 
and how we can avoid reading Meschonnic in an ethnic-essentialist way. 
Meschonnic is fond of a widespread, classic Orientalist trope to the effect that the 
Semitic languages are ‘body languages’. For example: 
 
De plus, le terme qui désigne l’accent rythmique, constitutif du verset (la notion du 
verset étant attestée dès le IIe siècle) est à lui seul une parabole du corps-langage: c’est 
le mot ta am, au pluriel ta amim, qui signifie le goût de ce qu’on a dans la bouche, la 
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saveur, cette saveur faisant la raison du dire, et c’est le sens même, et premier, de 
l’oralité. Ce qui vient de la bouche. 
(The term that designates the rhythmic accent, constitutive of the Biblical verse (the 
verset, a notion attested starting in the 2nd century) is itself a parable of the language-
body: it is the word ta am, plural ta amim, which signifies the taste of what is in the 
mouth, the flavour, this flavour being the reason for the saying, and this is the very 
meaning, and the first meaning, of orality. What comes from the mouth.)27 
 
Such passages abound in Meschonnic. They sound insightful, evocative and harmless. When 
Herder said comparable things in 1782, it was as part of his argument that Hebrew poetry was 
superior to its Indo-European counterparts: 
 
Alles in ihr ruft: ‘ich lebe, bewege mich, wirke. Mich erschufen Sinne und 
Leidenschaften, nicht abstrakte Denker und Philosophen’ […D]ie Sprache ist mit voller 
Brust, mit noch unausgebrauchten starken Organen, aber unter einem reinen und 
leichten Himmel, mit scharfem Blick, immer gleichsam die Sache selbst erfassend und 
fast nie ohne Spur der Leidenschaft gebildet worden. 
(Everything in it [the Hebrew language] proclaims: I live, and move, and act. The 
senses and the passions, not abstract reasoners and philosophers were my creators 
[...T]he language was moulded and uttered with a fuller expiration from the lungs, with 
organs yet pliable and vigorous, but at the same time under a clear and luminous 
heaven, with powers of vision acute, and seizing as it were upon the very objects 
themselves, and almost always with some mark of emotion and passion.)28  
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Three-quarters of a century later, Renan’s Orientalist discourse continues to make Hebrew 
out to be the Other: 
 
La race religieuse et sensitive des peuples sémitiques ne se peint-elle pas trait pour trait 
dans ces langues toutes physiques, auxquelles l’abstraction est inconnue et la 
métaphysique impossible? 
(Is not the religious and sensitive race of the Semitic peoples painted stroke by stroke in 
these totally physical languages, in which abstraction is unknown and metaphysics 
impossible?)29  
 
Still today we hear examples cited for this supposed ‘total physicality’, such as the use of the 
same Hebrew word ףא (ʔaf) for nose and anger. But English uses heart to mean courage, and 
courage itself derives from a word for heart. Meschonnic’s example of the word for taste also 
being the word for the rhythmic accent is glossed as showing a language-mouth connection in 
Hebrew. But in Greek, isn’t the word for language γλώσσα, the tongue? And doesn’t tongue 
also mean language in English? 
The pull of this cherry-picking essentialism is strong. When drawn to something 
potentially dangerous, we should either avoid it or choose to be drawn to it with our eyes 
open to the risks of slipping from language to ethnic to racial essentialism, and ready with our 
arguments to forestall the slippage.  
Unlike many people, I can forgive Herder, Renan and Humboldt for not having foreseen 
where their racial essentialism might lead in the twentieth century. And I do not blame 
Meschonnic for assuming that his readers knew where it did lead, and that they would never 
be tempted down the language-race path. Although aware of the enduring presence of anti-
Semitism in France, the thought of it again becoming a serious threat seemed unimaginable 
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until recently, even to him, the son of Jewish immigrants who as a boy escaped deportation 
during the German occupation. He speaks of the period in vague allusions. Yet that path of 
racial essentialism has been so intellectually tempting for so many centuries that, the farther 
we get from the Nazi period, the more we need to worry on Meschonnic’s behalf about how 
his treatment of Hebrew language-thought might come to be interpreted and used. 
I have brought up Havelock because with him we get a historical picture very like 
Meschonnic’s, but where the risk of being labelled Romantic does not carry the much more 
disturbing taint of ethnic essentialism, because it is the ‘same’ Greek language and culture he 
is talking about. Well, not really: Havelock ties Old Greek and New Greek to two cultural 
stages so distinct that they are not the ‘same culture’; but ethnically they are the same. 
Havelock agreed with his Toronto School contemporaries, including Marshall McLuhan 
(1911-1980), that the development of writing brought about a sea change by making 
‘abstract’ thinking possible. He was equally concerned with how it was possible for epic 
poetry to develop before writing.30 Havelock contends that the Iliad and Odyssey were far 
more than entertaining stories and historical records. They were the encyclopaedia of 
everything the Greeks deemed worthy of knowing and passing on to the populace at large, 
now and in the future. How, he asks, was this possible before the invention of writing?  
The epic poems themselves seemed to exclude the answer that metre and other aspects 
of poetic form made memorisation possible. They do not use rhyme, their metrical patterns 
are not regular but complex and varying, and no tradition had come down of their musical 
settings, apart from pictorial and dramatic representations of bards reciting while plucking the 
lyre. Their sheer length had inclined some scholars to speculate that the Greeks had 
developed writing centuries before any of the surviving attestations. Havelock however had 
been more persuaded by a different line of research. The recordings that Milman Parry (1902-
1935) and Albert Lord (1912-1991) made of a living tradition of oral poetry in the Balkans 
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opened a direct link to Homeric prehistory, or at least as direct a line as might be imagined 
possible. 
Through Parry’s work, Havelock came to believe that the Homeric tradition had not 
depended on writing at all, indeed that its spirit was wholly antithetical to everything that the 
written word represented.31 The Balkan bards showed how poetic texts of vast length, far 
beyond what the average school-educated European could possibly commit to memory, were 
retainable, supposedly in unvarying form,32 using all the resources of both mind and body, 
including music, dance, and the sort of embodied performance that inspired psychological 
identification of both bard and audience with the characters whose voices were being 
channelled.  
Havelock maintained that the form was an integral part of how the encyclopaedia 
contained in the Homeric epics became embodied in both reciters and audience. Based again 
on modern oral traditions as observed by Parry, Havelock contends that ‘the main onus of 
sheer repetition, which the memory needs as its prop, is transferred to the meaningless 
metrical pattern which is retained tenaciously in the memory’, and the verbal content is ‘then 
so expressed as to fit acoustically into the pattern’. Meschonnic certainly would have bristled 
at ‘meaningless’ metrical pattern: to my knowledge he never discusses Havelock, though he 
is deeply critical of Walter J. Ong (1912-2003),33 who himself relied heavily on Havelock’s 
work. Still, Meschonnic would likely have endorsed the role Havelock assigns to ‘reflexes’, 
all the movements of the organs such as tongue, lips, lungs and larynx by which speech is 
produced,34 and on how still other bodily reflexes are brought into play to assist the 
educational work.  
In contemporary oral recitation as observed by Parry, the bodies of the audience are 
pulled into the rhythm of the epic, as their legs and feet are brought into ‘motions as 
organised in dancing’. The text becomes inscribed in their nervous system; it becomes part of 
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the body. The verbal content is ‘then so expressed as to fit acoustically into the pattern’. This 
process restricts the possible combinations of sound and rhythmic elements, which would 
otherwise be practically limited, and so ‘The requirements of memory are met in a 
fundamental fashion through practising a strict economy of possible combination of reflexes’, 
where by reflexes Havelock means all the movements of the organs such as tongue, lips, 
lungs and larynx by which speech is produced.35 
But still other bodily reflexes are brought into play to assist the educational work. The 
performer accompanies his recital with music played on the lyre. The music will 
 
continually confirm his memory of the pattern which he is keeping. But the more 
obvious effect is directed not on himself but on his audience. Their ear drums are 
bombarded simultaneously by two disparate sets of sounds organised in concordant 
rhythm: the metrical speech and the instrumental melody. The latter must be repetitive; 
it […] exists only to make the words more recollectable […].36 
 
Once again ‘we confront here a pattern of organised actions, the function of which is 
mnemonic. It moves in a rhythm which parallels that of the spoken words, and spaces and 
punctuates them, so that the choric recitation becomes also a bodily performance’. Even if we 
do not know whether this audience participation also took place in ancient performances, we 
can be confident that the audience at least watched the performers’ movements, ‘in which 
case’, Havelock says, ‘the mnemonic assistance is mediated to them through their eyes’. 
Havelock believed that the physiological patterns involved ‘become automatic reflexes’ 
in the voice organs, which are ‘then strengthened by parallel behaviour in other parts of the 
body (ears and limbs)’.37 The result is that ‘The entire nervous system […] is geared to the 
task of memorisation’, such that the unconscious mind is put at the service of the conscious, 
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in his terms – but in the context it is hard to see how the unconscious is anything other than 
‘the entire nervous system’ conjoined with ‘the body’. If Havelock was imagining some sort 
of psychoanalytic unconscious pulling the strings, he does not say so; no doubt some of his 
audience read that into what he wrote, but he cites no psychoanalytic or even psychological 
literature. 
Although Meschonnic could be expected to reject the discontinuity that Havelock 
implies between words and music, along with Havelock’s single-minded focus on the 
mnemonic function, the fact that Havelock goes as far as he does in Meschonnic’s direction, 
within Greek culture as opposed to between Greek and Hebrew, suggests that no essential 
ethnic difference needs to be read into Meschonnic’s treatment of Biblical language and its 
translation. Other problems remain, including the one with which this article opened: what to 
do about his lumping together of ‘structuralists’. In his quest for continuities Meschonnic 
himself can arguably be seen as reverting to that holistic structuralism advocated by Cassirer. 
His reverence for Saussure, the founding figure of structuralism, is absolute, and if he 
consigns later structuralists to the lowest circle of Henri’s Inferno, it is because they claimed 
to be carrying out Saussure’s programme while in fact betraying its guiding spirit.  
Meschonnic found in Saussure’s ‘Double essence’ manuscripts, published in 2002,38 a 
movement away from conceiving of the language system as a fact of nature, and instead as 
being itself a representation of what is ultimately a language-body continuum. Much has been 
made of Saussure’s comment that with language, it is the point of view that creates the object 
of study – a comment that is in fact in the Cours de linguistique générale,39 but that the 
‘Double essence’ manuscripts develop more fully.40 Meschonnic is perhaps unique in reading 
point de vue not only as referring to the linguist’s own positioning vis-à-vis the object of 
study, but as taking vue literally, as one of the senses, requiring a bodily organ. This recalls a 
comment of Meschonnic’s about ‘theory’ being the discourse of what it cannot see, and what 
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it nevertheless shows.41 Saussure’s points de vue make him the opposite of a theoretician, 
from the point of view of a Meschonnic who endured what he called the ‘Structuralist Terror’ 
of theory in 1970s Paris.42 
And what about Benveniste, whose work on énonciation, and on the history of the 
concept of rhythm,43 were cited by Meschonnic as core inspirations for his own approach? 
Benveniste is generally classified as a structuralist, and although we can characterise his 
attitude from 1939 onwards as a ‘resistant embrace’, he never directly renounced structuralist 
linguistics.44 He presented énonciation as a research track parallel to it, not as a replacement 
for it. Meschonnic’s condemnation of structuralists might have included an attenuating 
footnote for Benveniste, whose work on rhythm he elsewhere calls paradoxical: 
 
Le paradoxe est que Benveniste n’a pas développé ce travail, tout en étant le premier et 
le seul à l’avoir rendu possible. C’est qu’il faisait une linguistique du discours, et que, 
peut-être, il y fallait une poétique du discours: qui analyse le poème comme révélateur 
du fonctionnement du rhythme dans le discours. Et Benveniste permet cette poétique, 
mais ne la constitue pas lui-même. 
(The paradox is that Benveniste did not develop this work, despite being the first and 
only one to have made it possible. It is because he practised a linguistics of discourse, 
when perhaps what was needed was a poetics of discourse, one which analyses the 
poem as revelatory of the functioning of rhythm in discourse. And Benveniste permits 
this poetics, but does not himself constitute it.)45 
 
Still, any unfairness in Meschonnic’s treatment of Benveniste is relatively trivial next to ‘the 
Hebrew question’ discussed earlier – a phrase I use not despite but because of the disturbing 
historical-rhythmic echoes it sets off. 
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By drawing attention to the historical echoes, I have aimed to stave off potential 
misunderstanding of Meschonnic, my admiration and adoration of whose work are as visceral 
as the worries I have expressed. I shall close with a further reminder (to myself as well as to 
readers) that the prison-house of language from which Meschonnic struggled to break free 
had a number of interlocking chambers: the university system in which he was employed to 
teach structural linguistics; the orthodoxy imposed by colleagues in the field; the 
‘Structuralist Terror’ emanating from adjoining fields; the tension felt by a poet constrained 
to follow the norms of academic writing; the Jewish heritage which meant that he would 
never be universally accepted as wholly French, not even by himself; the French poetic 
tradition with its effete pride in having counter-naturally (or so it felt to him) passed beyond 
mere rhythmic beats to a more refined form of verse based on syllable counting. Beats are 
what we feel in our chest, unlike the arbitrary dozen syllables of the alexandrine line. Metrics, 
originating in the formalisation of music, is projected onto the rhythms of language, 
regularising, suppressing, neutering them, In popular music, however, Meschonnic’s 
contempories in France and elsewhere were feeling the beat, as rock-and-roll, the heir to 
swing and jazz, pushed more ‘refined’ French song out of the Top 40. Henri Meschonnic was 
determined to do the same – to ‘beat’ his way out of the prison, and to make us understand 
that structuralists were wrong to treat rhythm as meaningless. Duke Ellington and Irving 
Mills were right: it don’t mean a thing if it ain’t got that swing. Doo-ah, doo-ah, doo-ah, doo-
ah, doo-ah, doo-ah, doo-ah, doo-ah. That last line’s sublime, ineffable eloquence, which owes 
at least as much to the composer Ellington as to the lyricist Mills, proves, if proof were 
needed, that meaning can inhere in rhythm alone. 
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